Research on the impact of the internet in the Middle East has been dominated by a focus on politics and the public sphere, and oscillated between the hope for "revolutionary" 
el- Magd, 2010; Amro Hassan, 2009) . Across the region, governments demonstrated their nervousness by cracking down harder on bloggers. Meanwhile, the "blogging revolution" (Loewenstein, 2008) failed to topple a single régime, and by 2008, David Faris noted "a fatigue with Egyptian blogging" that he attributed to the hyper-prominence of a few (three!) bloggers which made it "difficult for new voices to be heard." 6 Again, however, a savior had already appeared on the horizon: "Social networking sites where 12-year-old girls trade make-up secrets have become breeding grounds for revolution," the co-editor of Arab Media & Society declared (Pintak, 2008) . Facebook became "the next generation" platform and was regarded as the new way out that "might work better" than political parties for organizing social action, since, allegedly, it was more community-oriented, not least because it reduced the transaction costs for group-formation (Faris, 2008) . This new enthusiasm was ignited by what became known in Egypt as the "Facebook Party," founded, or so it was reported, by the "Facebook Girl." Where traditional political parties had failed, where blogging fatigue had set in, Facebook groups were going to succeed, even if the people behind them were unaware of the momentous change the researcher was uncovering: "revolutions without revolutionaries." "Esraa Abdel Fattah probably had no idea she was going to create a global phenomenon when she started a Facebook group in March of 2008" (Faris, 2008) . The group 7 -membership of which exploded to over 70,000 in a few weeks, or almost 10% of all Egyptians on Facebook at the time-was calling for solidarity with the April 6 strike planned by workers in Egypt's largest public sector textile company in al-Ma#alla al-Kubrà. The workers' strike-the largest in a series of labor actions that Egypt had witnessed for years-was suppressed by security forces. The Facebook strike-which had called on people to stay at home-was interpreted as a success by eager commentators.
A few critical voices pointed out that it was not entirely clear whether Cairo streets were emptier than usual on April 6 due to a sandstorm, combined with people's fear of ending up in confrontations with the police. The government was wary enough of the new platform to arrest the Facebook Girl and push her into public submission. Pro-government papers published an avalanche of articles denouncing Facebook as undermining the good morale of the Egyptian people. But activists themselves knew better. In particular, $us!m al-$amal!w" (3arabawi) of the International Socialist Tendency pointed out that it was grassroots movement on the ground, rather than a mouse click on Facebook, that accounted for the making or breaking of a successful strike (al-$amal!w", 2008c) . And he was proven right faster than he may have wanted. In the wake of their April 6 elation, Facebook activists called for a strike on May 4, President Mubarak's 80th birthday. When that call went unheeded, research concluded that "[t]he trouble with relying on past successes in social activism is that it often does not work the same way the second time around" (Faris, 2008) . A year later, in 2009, the "Facebook Revolution" was declared dead: "Facebook activism is now dismissed as useless at best, and the failure of the April 6th group to engender a lasting political movement has come to symbolize the futility of even trying" (Faris, 2009 Again, however, a new technology platform gave rise to "some hope." The failure of April 6 was only the "end of the beginning," for Facebook was a mere digression: "[The] focus on Facebook also appears to have missed the apparent shift of online dissent from blogs to Twitter" (Faris, 2009 ). Twitter had already been noted in the aftermath of the April 6, 2008, events when an American student, James
Buck, twittered his way out of police custody in Ma#all!. "Twitter Saves Man From Egyptian Justice" was the headline on TechCrunch, the world's leading blog on Web 2.0 technologies; CNN then helped to spread the news to the whole world (Arrington, 2008; Simon, 2008) . Hardly anyone commented on the fact that it was only the U.S. citizen Buck, with legal help organized by his home university UC Berkeley, who was released from the police station-his Egyptian translator stayed behind, along with 42 others who had been arrested during the demonstrations. Even the otherwise skeptical $us!m al-$amal!w", on whose blog news of Buck's arrest was published two minutes after the original tweet (al-$amal!w", 2008a), excitedly exclaimed: "The Revolution will be Twitterized!" (al-$amal!w", 2008b) . 8 The dream of the "Twitter revolution" (Micek & Whitlock, 2008) materializing in politics was rekindled first in Moldova (Morozov, 2009b) , then again in Iran in 2009. Internet guru Clay Shirky (2009) declared: "[T] his is it. The big one. This is the first revolution that has been catapulted onto a global stage and transformed by social media." Here we have it again, the "global stage," the "global phenomenon" that Egypt's Facebook Girl was said to have created. But note that, more than about actual events on the ground in Iran, Clay Shirky was excited about how "the whole world is watching," i.e., about how Twitter allowed international media users the breathless feeling of receiving and forwarding minute-by-minute updates on unfolding events.
Revolution here ran in danger of being reduced to a mere media event, while the actual régimes were not revolved from power. While people in New York cafés were forwarding tweets that gave them the thrilled feeling of partaking in a revolution, Iranian conservatives tightened their grip on power using YouTube videos and other Internet evidence to identify and arrest opposition activists. Critics therefore concluded that the Twitter revolution was mostly America's Twitter revolution, or a boon to Twitter's business plan (Forte, 2009) . Evgeny Morozov, who (in spite of being a critic of techno-determinism and cyberutopianism; see Morozov, 2009a) had been the one responsible for coining events in Moldova a "Twitter revolution," subsequently became so disillusioned that he published The Net Delusion (Morozov, 2011a) , warning that Western obsession with promoting democracy by digital means could backfire, as authoritarian governments could use the Internet to hone their surveillance techniques, disseminate cutting-edge propaganda, and pacify their populations with digital entertainment.
And then it happened. Again. A "Twitter revolution" in Tunisia; a "Facebook revolution" in Egypt.
And this time, it was for real. Presidents did leave, régimes were changing, if grudgingly and all the while trying to preserve as much of the ancien régime as possible. And while this was still ongoing, one of the public faces of the Egyptian revolution, 9 Wael Ghonim, updated the old concept to its Web 2.0 incarnation:
8 Repeated the year after by Andrew Sullivan, (2009) who exclaimed with regard to Iran, "The revolution will be twittered."
9 I am using the term "revolution" here because it has been adopted by the actors themselves, and because it can be justified in its broad meaning of "any and all instances in which a state or a political was collaborating in the Egyptian "Revolution 2.0," contributing in small or big ways, and at the end of the day, "from just an idea that sounded crazy," just like they had built "the largest encyclopedia in the world," people created "one of the most inspiring stories in the history of mankind." Revolution 2.0 had "completely changed" a country and a people that "for thirty years had been on a downhill," where figures who were protecting their people from an immaturity that would lead to chaos if the people were allowed to rule, if unfettered democracy would be put in place. And for those who were not convinced, the paternalistic régime had a variety of sanctions in store, police brutality being just one of them. The 30-year-olds had grown up beneath this "barrier of fear," this #"$iz al-khawf: "If I speak up, I will be beaten up." I could end up like Khaled Said. So the experience that using the Internet and Facebook to mobilize against police corruption and brutality could be successful was a mighty one. It is therefore regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion" (Goodwin, 2001, p. 9) .
International Journal of Communication 5 (2011) understandable that Wael Ghonim and many Internet activists are profoundly sincere in claiming that it was the Internet which broke this barrier of fear, that it was the Internet which had brought them freedom.
A Preoccupation with the "New" and the "Political"
But in observing and understanding this excitement, we shouldn't forget that we have seen this before; we have seen high hopes and deep disappointment before, alternating in rapid succession.
Remember how, in 2009, Facebook activism was "dismissed as useless at best" by the very people who only a year earlier had hailed its revolutionary potential? Remember how the man who saw a "Twitter revolution" in Moldova became convinced, a year later, that we were all in danger of falling victim to a Net Delusion?
The fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian régimes has led to a fresh flurry of exchanges on the role of the Internet, and in particular the role of "social media," in these events. Cyber-skeptics Gladwell (2010, 2011) were derided as hopelessly yesteryear: "See? Here is your Facebook revolution!"
The skeptics replied: "We never said that social media did not play a role; we just pointed out that it is a mere tool, a tool that can be used by protesters and governments alike, and where big brother may turn out to prevail in the end!" To which the other side retorted: "But we never said that that social media alone can bring about a revolution; it is a tool, but a highly important tool that changes the dynamics of what's going on on the ground." And so this debate continued for a while between two sides that were partly working with simplistic caricatures of their opponents' arguments, ignoring the finer points made by the other side (Morozov, 2011b) . To an extent, the debate between "cyber-skeptics" and "cyber-utopians" reflects the yo-yo pattern of alternating hope and disappointment that appears to be a characteristic thread in how we have come to look at media impact in the Middle East. I see two kinds of problems with this. The first one was pointed out by a number of prominent media researchers in a report in August 2010:
Do new media have real consequences for contentious politics . . . ? The sobering answer is that, fundamentally, no one knows [because to] this point, little research has sought to estimate the causal effects of new media in a methodologically rigorous fashion, or to gather the rich data needed to establish causal influence. Without rigorous research designs or rich data, partisans of all viewpoints turn to anecdotal evidence and intuition (Aday et al., 2010, p. 5) In other words, we haven't come past the stage of hypothesis building. In the absence of more systematic research, cyber-utopians and cyber-skeptics will continue to throw anecdotes at one another to demonstrate how effective or not social media is in bringing about revolutions. And so here, to put research about the political effects of new media on firmer ground, we need more systematic data. As (1) transform (or not) individuals' attitudes and willingness to engage in political action;
(2) "mitigate or exacerbate group conflict"; (3) "facilitate collective action"; (4) help régimes to better spy on and control their citizens; and (5) "garner international attention."
The other problem that I want to point out, however, beyond this call for more systematic research on media's impact on politics, is precisely that most of us continue to be preoccupied with politics, with the question, "Do new media have real consequences for contentious politics?" It may sound strange in these revolutionary times, but this preoccupation with politics has slanted our understanding of the role of the Internet in the Middle East. If we look back at the main focus of the research that has been published so far in this area, we find that much of it was initially driven by a hope that the Internet would be a decisive factor in bringing about political change in the region. When such change was slow to materialize, research turned its attention to the "public sphere." As Marc Lynch, one of the foremost Middle East media scholars, recommended back in 2007, "Rather than focus on whether blogs alone can deliver democracy or a political revolution, analysts should explore the variety of ways in which blogs might transform the dynamics of Arab public opinion and political activism."
But this focus on politics, and the quest for revolutionary effects of new media that is often underlying it, limits our perspective. The horizon of our research gets limited by a preoccupation with the new, exemplified in "new" technologies and "new" media, and a preoccupation with the political. "Will the Internet, will blogging, will podcasting, Facebook, or Twitter bring democracy?" It is almost as if we are continuously searching for political utopia through the next generation of technology. A "nextopia," if I may borrow the expression from a Swedish marketing professor (Dahlén, 2008) . Long-term developments reaching far back into history, and private and personal dynamics, tend to fall off the radar in this view.
Taking the Social Dimension of Social Media Seriously
Due to the focus on political change, and the quest for political revolution, the influence of the Internet in the social and cultural domains has been much less in the limelight. 11 One finds occasional observations on how mobile communication and social networking threaten established models for appropriate gender relations, and recently, we have begun to see work on how literature (belles-lettres)
fares when published and consumed on the Internet. But overall, Walter Armbrust's (2007) plea has so far remained largely unheeded: "The last thing I would like to see is a repetition of the sterile debate over the political effects of al-Jazeera carried out in academic analyses of blogs." An "old and familiar concern for politics" structures much of Middle Eastern studies, including media studies, and has come "at the expense of the rest of the content" that is being communicated on the media. At a minimum-and still with an eye for public politics-Armbrust calls for looking at the Internet "as a new phase in a long evolution in hierarchies of authority," and asks us to investigate its complex effects on the social construction of 11 A notable exception is Braune (2008) . , 2006; arablibrarian, 2007) . Who did such dismissive ideas come from? It was people of authority-parents, educators, "responsible" journalists and researchers, police officers, etc. 13 My point here is not that the observation that a lot of people were using the Internet for chatting and entertainment was wrong; it is to highlight the dismissive attitude toward this type of "more futile" (Salvatore, 2011) use. This is an attitude that attaches greater importance to the "serious," the public, the political than it does to the private and the personal. It is an attitude that may be shared by people in authority, activists in opposition, and political scientists alike, and one that is betrayed even in innocuous statements such as this quotation from an And this is the crucial point. It is the attitude that changes, the attitude of individual users toward authority, a disregard for the long chain of authority, for established hierarchies that used to structure decision making. We find this attitude all over the Arabic Internet; it is deplored by people in authority and positively asserted by ever more young users themselves. In the realm of religion, to take another field, more and more people are asserting-sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly-their right to question and dismiss religious authorities. Take, for example, the "global mufti" Y#suf al-Qara&!w", one of the most Therefore, these arenas are places that we need more research on as far as Middle Eastern users are concerned in order better to understand the dynamics going on there. But we can already see some structural elements that are inherent in the code that, itself, structures communication on the Internet.
Since it is individual users who do the picking and choosing and forwarding, they thereby become more important elements in the construction and reconstruction of cognitive and normative content-content pertaining to their social worlds, to religion, to culture, and also to politics. Even those who are not adding their own voice, but merely picking and forwarding, thereby become more important actors in the social construction of knowledge than the likes of them have been before. "I'm a maker-not a taker" is a slogan spread by the "Life Makers" campaign of the televangelist "Amr Kh!lid, star among the young. This widely successful campaign draws on and aims to strengthen the attitude that "I can actually make a difference"; I can change things, at least in my own immediate circle, and the first thing I can change is the attitude that we can't change anything anyhow. This attitude has grown for years on Internet fora, even among those who were not planning revolutions but only calling for a greener neighborhood or a little more say in their own lives. And of course, this idea that "Yes, we can change things," got a huge boost in the early months of 2011, when political revolution actually did happen, even though, in the true yo-yo spirit of hope and despair, no one had expected it to happen so "soon." 
The Weight of Individuals: A Generational Evolution
Prior to the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, I had urged us to take seriously the metaphor of "the next generation." After all, a breathless focus on the latest and newest technologies, often coupled with only scarcely taking into account the historical dynamics that predated the emergence of the "new media" in the 1990s, works to obscure more long-term evolutionary developments. These are developments that happen over many generations, human generations. And what happens through generational change certainly is reflected by, and may be propelled by, new media technologies, but it has many more dimensions to it (Hofheinz, 2005 Twitter (not to forget blogs, discussion fora, and landline phones) were used to organize and mobilize demonstrators, to circumvent state control, and to enlist a pan-Arab and global public imaginary. But the heyday of revolutionary activism will pass; everyday life will return, and Internet use will become less "revolutionary" again. When that happens, however, it will remain just as important networks, including social networking sites, and it means that the social self-evidence of established authorities becomes more volatile. Of course, authorities have, at all times, had to construct their authoritativeness through social processes; they have had to negotiate and legitimate their authority and prove it to the social groups that they wanted to influence. Today, the "crowds" they need to take into account are becoming larger and faster than ever before. In other words, the general fact that crowds and authorities are in a mutually dependent dynamics has not changed, but the weight of crowds, and of the individuals that make up the crowds, has grown. Thus, with the increasing spread of social media and mobile communication, the social networks of knowledge construction are becoming not only vastly bigger and quicker and less limited by space and time constraints than they have been before, but also more of a threat to established authorities. Internet. It began to spread in earnest in the 17th and 18th centuries when Muslim preachers (using, by the way, the new technologies of the time, like pamphlets and vernacular language) tore down a key concept that had dominated the conception of religious authority for five centuries: that "the believer must be in the hands of his teacher like a corpse in the hands of the one who washes it," and therefore obey and comply, even if the teacher gives an order ostensibly in conflict with the prescriptions of the Divine Law, the shar#!a. This was no longer acceptable to 18th-century reformers who worked to spread the idea that every believer had the right and duty to hold up presumed authorities to the standards of the Scriptures, and who therefore encouraged everyone to go back to the Scriptures instead of relying on secondary sources. It dates from that time that growing numbers of people have actually read the Qur!!n and held up the Scriptures against established authority (Hofheinz, 1996) . Thus, what happens on the Internet today can be seen in part as a continuation of a much older story, where individuals are encouraged to judge authorities by a generalized standard that is accessible, in principle, for everyone.
Placed in such a wider historical context, the Internet may loose some of its "revolutionary" mystique-but this may be just what is needed to gain a more sober understanding of its impact in the Middle East.
